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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves issues relating to the sale ofreal property, and the associated

contracts and addenda. Appellants, James and Barbara Hilliard ("Hilliards") sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief, asking for disbursement of the sum of $3,000,00.00 in
sales proceeds held by Guaranty Title, Inc. Respondent Murphy Land Compnay, LLC
("Murphy") counterclaimed, asking that the funds held be disbursed to it as damages for
the time it did not have possession of the subject property.
This appeal specifically seeks the review of an order for summary judgment entered
by the Third District Court in favor of Murphy.

B.

Course of the Proceedings Below
In December of 2010 the Hllliards sold real property located in Owyhee County to

Murphy Land Company. Pending deletions of certain exceptions to the title insurance
policy it was agreed that three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) of the purchase price would
be held in escrow by the title insurance company (Guaranty Title).
Subsequently, the exceptions to the title policy were deleted. The parties were
unable to agree as to the disposition of the escrowed monies. The Hilliards filed a
complaint seeking disbursement to them of the escrowed funds. Murphy Land Compnay
filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim urging that it should receive the
escrowed funds.

4

Murphy Land Company thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported
by the affidavit of one of the owners of Murphy Land Company (Frank Tiegs) seeking the
court's award of the escrowed monies to it. The Hilliards responded to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, supported in part by four (4) affidavits. Murphy objected to aspects of
the Hilliards pro-offered affidavits and moved to strike and disregard portions of each of
them.
The Court heard Murphy's motion for summary judgment and heard argument on
Murphy's motion to strike and disregard affidavit testimony pro-offered by the Hilliards on
the same day.
After oral argument, the Court granted in significant part Murphy's motion to strike
and disregard the affidavit testimony pro-offered by the Hiliards. In addition, the Court
accepted without more the affidavit testimony of Frank Tiegs on the part of Murphy as to
the extent of the "damages". Notwithstanding, that Mr. Tiegs opined in his affidavit that
Murphy's damages were in excess of three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) the Court
granted summary judgment in that amount as the amount sought by Murphy's attorneys.
Thereafter, the Hilliards filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The motion
was resisted by Murphy and after briefing and argument, the Court denied the motion and
subsequently awarded Murphy attorney fees and costs.
This appeal follows.

5

C.

Statement of the Facts

James and Barbara Hilliard are husband and wife. For many years they owned a
farm in Owyhee County, Idaho called Crystal Springs Farm. That farm was comprised of
almost 4,000 acres. Approximately 3,000 acres are farmable. After they purchased the
farm they leased to various farmers who grew row crops, such as potatoes and sugar beets,
on their leased portions of that land. Also for many years the Billiards orally leased the
remaining portions of the farmable land to John W. Clark who raised hay and grain crops
thereon. During the 2009 and 2010 growing seasons the Hilliards leased row crop portions
of that farm to Lance Funk,d.b.a. Lance Funk Farms, LLC. Also, during the 2009 growing
season, the Billiards leased the remaining, non-row crop, portions of the farm to Jay P.
Clark.
In January 2010 Jay P. Clark, who also represented the Billiards as their lawyer in
several other matters, obtained a written lease from the Billiards titled "Crop Share Lease
2010" for Crystal Springs Farm which purported to give him a one-year lease, but was
renewable at his sole option for a period of (10) years. On January 25, 2010 Jay P. Clark,
without the Billiards' knowledge or consent, recorded that lease in Owyhee County, Idaho.
On June 4, 2010, John W. Clark recorded a "Memorandum of Ownership Interest
in Real Property" in Owyhee County wherein he claimed, under a purported oral
agreement, to have a ten percent (10%) ownership interest in Crystal Springs Farm. That
filing created a second cloud on the Billiards' title to Crystal Springs Farm.
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During the fall of 2010 the Hilliards retained Robert F. Bennett to act as their
realtor to sell Crystal Springs Farm. A short time later, they learned of the clouds on their
title to that farm. Thereafter, prospective purchasers were informed of those clouds.
When Mr. Bennett learned that Lance Funk, d.b.a. Lance Funk Farms, had leased the
row crop portions of Crystal Springs Farm from the Hilliards during the two prior growing
seasons,Mr. Bennett asked Mr. Funk whether he would be interested in purchasing that
property.
On November 5, 2010 James and Barbara Hilliard as Sellers and Lance Funk or
Assignees as Buyer (Murphy Land Company, LLC of which Lance Funk is one of the
principals become the assignee of Lance Funk, buyer) entered into a preprinted form
agreement titled "RE-23 COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE PURCHASE
AND SALE AGREEMENT' which provided for a $9,500,000 purchase price. The closing
date for that transaction was to be December 28, 2010.
On November 18, 2010 Pioneer Title Co. wrote to Guaranty Title enclosing it's
commitment for the "Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement" of November 5, 2010.
That commitment included Exceptions 32 and 33 which were for the clouds on the
Hilliards' title to Crystal Springs Farm created by Jay P. Clark and John W. Clark.
In mid-December, 2010 the Hilliards caused Jay P. Clark to be served with a Notice
to Quit, but he ignored that notice and continued in possession of the Farm. However, he
did sub-lease a portion thereof to an entity controlled by the principals of Murphy Land
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Company, LLC.
On December 28, 2010 the Hilliards and Lance Funk extended the closing date for
the sale one day to December 29, 2010, but the transaction did not close on that day.
On December 30, 2010 the Hilliards were unavailable to close the transaction and
so they gave their son, James W. Hilliard, a power of attorney to sign a document titled
"RE-11 ADDENDUM NO. 4" which required the Hilliards to deposit $3,000,000 of the
purchase price with Guaranty Title, Inc. as Trustee. Those funds were to be held in trust
pending an endorsement to Buyer's policy of title insurance deleting Exceptions Nos. 32
and 33 shown on the commitment for title insurance. Those funds were to be "available to
the extent determinedby a court of competent jurisdiction of the purchaser's damage, if
any, for loss or delay of possession ofreal estate purchased herein."
On February 16, 2011 the Hilliards sued Jay P. Clark and John W. Clark In Owyhee
County to clear title to Crystal Springs Farm. On March 32, 2012 District Judge Culet
entered an Order declaring Jay P. Clark's"Crop Share Lease 201 O" to be null and void and
he expunged John W. Clark's "Memorandum of Ownership Interest in Real Property" from
the records of Owyhee County.
On March 29, 2012 First American Title Company deleted from the title insurance
policy it had issued to Murphy Land Company, LLC the exceptions pertaining to the clouds
Jay P. Clark and John W. Clark had placed on the Hilliards' title to Crystal Springs Farm.
On May 2, 2012 Murphy Land Company, LLC obtained full possession of Crystal

8

Springs Farm.
As set forth above this litigation follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for the Supreme
Court of Idaho is the same standard imposed upon the district court in ruling on the
motion. 1
The entry of summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter oflaw. 2 However, a mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt in opposition
to the movant's position is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 3
Specifically, the nonmoving party must submit more than conclusory assertions that an
issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. 4 In making the determination
as to whether summary judgment is appropriate, when there is conflicting evidence
concerning material issues, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable

1

2

Watson v. Weick, 141 Jdaho 500,504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005).
Idaho R. Civ. P. 56{c).

3

Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,897, 155 P.3d 695,698 (2007).

4

Id. at 896-97, 155 P.3d at 697-98.

9

inferences from the record, are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the summary judgment motion. 5 However, when the trier of fact would be the district
judge, and not a jury, the judge may grant summary judgment on undisputed evidentiary
facts, despite conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be responsible for
choosing those inferences. 6 In such cases, where a judge exercises that power, it should
make findings to identify the inferences drawn or rejected, and identify the evidentiary
facts upon which its decision is based. 7 Finally, "if the credibility of an affiant furnishing
direct evidence is put at issue by other, circumstantial evidence, the credibility issue should
not be resolved on summary judgment."11 "Summary judgment is not proper when the
relevant pleadings, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of the credibility of
witnesses. " 9
On appeal, this Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists and whether the moving party was and is entitled to judgment as a

5

Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership 145 Idaho 735, at 735-36, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008).

6

Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668,670,691 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct. App, 1984) citing Riverside

Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982).
7

Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,471; 700 P.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1985); citing Argyle v. Slemaker, 107

Idaho 668,691; P.2d 1283, 1305 (Ct. App. 1984).

s Id.
9

Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245,247; 646 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct. App. 1982),

citing Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Com., 94 Idaho 917,918; 500 P.2d 218,219 (1972).

10

matter of law. 10

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the District Court improperly weigh the evidence and assess the
credibility of witnesses?

B.

Did the District Court fail to construe disputed facts in favor of the
non-moving party?

C.
fact and

Did the District Court fail to support its judgment with findings of
conclusions of law?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Attorneys fees and costs are specifically provided for in real estate sale agreement,
and should be awarded to Hilliards pursuant to the contract between the parties. 11
In the alternative, Hilliards should be awarded their attorneys fees and costs pursuant to
LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-121. It is well-established law before this Court "that LC. §12-120
mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." 12
Appellants should be awarded their reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in
this appeal.

10

Ada County v. Fuhnnan, 140 Idaho 230,232, 91 P.3d 1134, 1136 (2004).

11

R., Supp., pp. 19-30.

Chavez v. Barrus 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008)., citing Cox v. Mulligan, 142 Idaho
356, 359, 128 P.3d 893, 896 (2005).
12
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ARGUMENT

A.

Did the District Court improperly weigh the evidence and assess

credibility of witnesses?
This Court has previously held that motions for summary judgment should be
granted with caution. 13 This is because of the nature of summary judgment, which with
absolute finality, curtails the litigation and effectively denies a party the right to have a full
trial. Summary judgment is granted only in the narrowest of circumstances where the
record before the trial court contains no conflicting facts from which reasonable minds
might reach different conclusions. 14 In other words, if there is more than one conclusion
which a reasonable person could draw from the facts and record presented to the judge
sitting in summary judgment, such a case is not appropriate for summary judgment and all
claims and issues should be reserved for resolution by the finder of fact at trial.
Idaho's appellate courts have addressed the prohibition against assessing the
credibility of witnesses at the summary judgment stage on numerous occasions. The Idaho
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "[a] motion for summary judgment should be
denied if the pleadings, admissions, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of
credibility of witness or weight of the evidence." 15

13

Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991);

14

Kline v. Clinton 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982).

15

Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414; 353 P.2d 647,659 (1960).

12

The district court initially struck the affidavit of Billiards' expert, Ken Edmunds,
based upon late disclosure, and lack of foundation to support his opinions. 16 In so doing,
the district court failed to properly consider the fact that Edmunds was identified as a
rebuttal witness, after Murphy identified Frank Tiegs as its expert. Murphy's disclosure
deadline was October 25, 2013; Hilliards identified Edmunds on October 29, 2013.
Murphy did not file any objection to the disclosure of Edmunds until it filed its Motion to
Strike on December 5, 2013, eight days before the hearing on Murphy's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The district court abused its discretion when it failed to recognize
that even though Edmunds may have been excluded from testifying in Billiards' case-inchief, he could have properly testified in Hilliards' rebuttal case. 17 Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure l(a) states that the "rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." The relevant inquiry, as
the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, should be whether or not the interests of justice are
served. 18 At the summary judgment stage, it was an abuse of discretion to exclude
Edmunds' testimony, and to fail to consider it on its own merit. Here, the district court
clearly looked at "foundational issues." It used them to criticize and exclude the facts

16

Tr., pp. 30-31.

17

See, e.g. McDonald v. Safeway Stores, 109 Idaho 305; 707 P.2d 416 (1985).

18

See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 334 (2006).

13

considered and opinions held by Edmund

in essence weighing the evidence.12 Moreover,

in evaluating the Edmunds affidavit, the district court weighed his opinions and credibility
against those submitted by Murphy's expert, Frank Tiegs, 20 The district court allowed
Tiegs to testify without requiring either supporting documents or foundation, but struck
testimony from Edmunds on those bases. Indeed, it held all of Hilliards' witnesses to a
higher standard than it held Tiegs and other Murphy witnesses. In Nield v. Pocatello
Health Services, 21 the Idaho Supreme Court found that the district court had impermissibly
relied upon statements contained in one expert's report in making its determination that
another expert's report was inadequate, utilizing the first expert's affidavit as a yardstick
against which the second expert's opinions were measured. The Supreme Court found held
the district court had abused its discretion, and vacated the summary judgment. 22
The district court's evaluation of the affidavit of Jay Clark is even more
problematic. The court made it clear on the record that it weighed his summary judgment
affidavit against his affidavit from another case and found them to be inconsistent, and that
it further evaluated Clark's credibility based upon his actions in the prior case:
"There has been testimony rendered by Mr. Clark, pursuant to those affidavits. And

19

See Hines v. Hines. 129 Idaho 847. 934 P.2d 20 (1997).

20

See, Tr., pp. 31-34.

21

__

22

Id.

Idaho _ _ ; _ _ P.3d. _ _ (2014, Docket No. 38823-2011, 2014 Opinion No. 20).
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the Court is entitled to view that testimony in the fashion that it has been given. The Court
finds that there is simply conflicting testimony about Mr. Clark's willingness to allow these
individuals on the land, and that is evidenced as

as indicated in the affidavit..... But the

Court is allowed to assess credibility, and the Court simply finds that based on those two
affidavits, as to that very narrow factual issue, the Court did not find Mr. Clark to be
credible about his willingness to allow the other individuals to enter the farm and/or to take
possession of the farm to engage in farming that -the purpose for which the farm was
purchased. ,m

The district court struck portions of Clark's affidavit because "the reason that he
knew the facts ... is that he was unwilling to vacate the property, despite being told to do
so."24 The court refused to allow Clark's testimony regarding farming in 2011 and 2012
because "[i]t has been determined that he was wrongfully in possession of that property
during that time frame.ms
The Idaho appellate courts have specifically found this sort of analysis to be
inappropriate in the summary judgment context:
Difficulties in remembering relevant facts, and the giving of
contradictory testimony are factors to be considered in determining a
witness' credibility. Summary judgment is not proper when the relevant

24

Tr., pp. 123-125 (emphasis added)
Tr., p. 38, 11. 15-18.

25

Tr., p. 37, II. 1-9.

23

15

pleadings, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of the credibility of
witnesses .... In summary judgment proceedings the facts are to be
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to
be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might reasonably
drawn from the evidence. Applying this rule to a case where, as here, an
issue has been raised concerning the credibility of a key witness, we hold
that summary judgment is inappropriate. 26
The Idaho appellate courts have long held that the proper method to determine a
witnesses' credibility is by testimony in court before the trier of fact. The district court
impermissibly weighed evidence and made credibility determinations at the summary
judgment stage, abusing her discretion, and under these circumstances, summary judgment
cannot lie.
B.

The District Court Failed to Construe Disputed Facts in Favor of the

Non-moving Party.

While acknowledging that Clark had knowledge regarding damages in the action,
the Court refused to consider the facts he testified to, including his work preparing the
ground for planting for the 2012 season, stating, "[y]es, but the reason that he knew the
facts that predicated Bis that he was unwilling to vacate the property, despite being told to
do so."27 The district court then went on to say, "the fact that Mr. Clark may have prepared
the land does not refute the [sic] paragraph 11. So the Court is going to strike that first

26

27

Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245,247; 646 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct.
App. 1982)
Tr., p. 38, II. 15-18.

16

sentence."28 Clearly, the district court misunderstood both its powers to determine
admissible evidence, and its duties under the standard for summary judgment. Instead of
properly construing disputed facts in favor of Hilliards, it haphazardly struck portions of
Hilliards affidavits, and, as argued supra, weighed them against the Tiegs Affidavit.
The district court seemed to misunderstand what is meant by drawing inferences
favorable to the moving party in a summary judgment setting, where the district court will
be in the ultimate finder of fact. In Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Brav, 29 the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated:
The legal standard allowing a trial court presented with a sun1mary
judgment motion to draw inferences favorable to the movant is to be applied
only in the face of undisputed facts. When evidence on material issues is in
conflict, the evidentiary facts must be viewed in favor of the party opposing
the motion.
Contrary to this standard, the district court believed it was "allowed to assess
credibility" and then stated "the Court did not find Mr. Clark to be credible." 30 The court
relied upon its assessment of Mr. Clark in finding his affidavit did not raise a factual
question regarding Murphy's damages. 31 The court summarily dismissed Clark's
testimony that he was ready, willing and able to rent the property, which would have

28

Tr., p. 40, II. 21-24.

29

138 Idaho 817; 69 P.3d I 078 (Ct. App. 2003).

30

Tr., p. 123, II. 19-20; p. 124, II. 19-25

31

See Tr., pp. 116-118; Tr. P. Tr., pp. 44-46.

17

mitigated Murphy's damages, 32 balancing that testimony against a prior affidavit by him in
a previous case. The duty to mitigate requires a party who is injured by another to take
reasonable steps to lessen his or her damages. 33 Hilliards have argued that Murphy could
have mitigated its damages by renting the farm from Clark, and Murphy argued that was
not a reasonable remedy. However, "the reasonableness of the method selected to
minimize damages is an issue to be resolved by the jury [or the trier of fact]." 34

.

The

district court also failed to consider Clark's testimony regarding historic yields and
preparation of the ground for the 2012 planting season, all of which would have bearing on
Murphy's damages. 35 For purposes of summary judgment, these facts must be construed
most favorably to Hilliards, which the district court failed to do
The district court failed to hold Murphy to the proper standard regarding damages.
While recognizing that there may be factual disputes regarding Murphy's claim, 36 the court
failed to properly consider those issues. Hilliards argued that Murphy's damage claims are
both speculative and inaccurate. Certainly, had the district court not seen fit to disregard

32

Tr., p. 116, IL 16-20.

33

D. Dobbs, Remedies, §3.7. at 186 (1973). See also Casey v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., 85

Idaho 299, 305; 379 P.2d 409, 412 (/963)
34

Davis v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 170; 765 P.2d 681,681 (1988).

35

Tr., pp. 36-38.

36

Tr.,pp.114-118.

18

and/or exclude Hilliards' evidence, there is ample support to conclude that Frank Tiegs'
cost and revenue projections are speculative, and that Murphy's damages were much lower
than Tiegs estimated. It is interesting to note that while the district court required
Hilliards' affiants to have supporting data and foundational documents in order for their
testimony to be considered, it did not hold Murphy's expert, Tiegs, to the same standard.
Mr. Tiegs qualifies his "projections" throughout his affidavit with language like "I would
expect," and "I estimate." Certainly at trial Mr. Tiegs would have been asked to compare
his "estimates" with actual yields during the 2013 growing season, when Murphy had
possession of the premises for the entire season. Factual questions regarding Murphy's
damage claim abound, and it was improper for the district court to grant summary
judgment on that issue.
It was not the duty of the trial court sitting in summary judgment to make factual
determinations where facts were in conflict. The function of the trial court is not to weigh
the evidence or to try the factual issues; the trial court's only duty in determining a
summary judgment motion is to determine whether or not there exists any genuine material
fact as adduced from the entire record.

C.

37

The District Court Failed to Support its Summary Judgment Grant

With Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Particularly Regarding its Exercise of

37

Kline, 103 Idaho at 121, 645 P.2d at 355.

19

the Ritchie Power.
Idaho's appellate courts have held that if a judge exercises the power granted to it
under Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 38 which holds that a judge, sitting without a
jury, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for
summary judgment, it should make findings to identify the inferences drawn or rejected,
and to identify the evidentiary facts upon which the decision is based. 39
In this case, the district court made no such findings. In fact, review of the Courts
findings and statements on the record lead to the inescapable conclusion that it failed to
understand the limits on discretion, and believed that it not only had the right to draw
inferences in favor of Murphy, but to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of
witnesses as well.
The trial court failed to identify what inferences it had drawn or rejected. It also failed to
identify the evidentiary facts upon which its decision was based, other than to state that
Billiards had failed to "sufficiently refute" the amount of damages alleged. 40
CONCLUSION
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must look to

38

103 Idaho 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982).

39

Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,471; 700 P.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1983), citing Argyle v. Slemaker,

107 Idaho 668,692; P.2d 1283 (Ct. App 1983).
40

Tr., p. 117, II. 20-25.

20

the totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings and attached exhibits, not
merely to portions of the record in isolation. 41 The summary judgment issued in this case
was issued after the trial court improperly eviscerated the affidavits filed by Hilliards, and
was predicated on the district court's determination that one of Hilliards' witness was not
credible. The core problem with this case is that was that it was not an appropriate
candidate for summary judgment. The district court failed to recognize that there were a
number of controverted facts which should have precluded entry of summary judgment,
and needed to be resolved at trial.
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